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Effects of visualizing statistical
information – an empirical study on
tree diagrams and 2 2 tables×
Karin Binder*, Stefan Krauss and Georg Bruckmaier
Mathematics Education, Faculty of Mathematics, University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
In their research articles, scholars often use 2 × 2 tables or tree diagrams including
natural frequencies in order to illustrate Bayesian reasoning situations to their peers.
Interestingly, the effect of these visualizations on participants’ performance has not
been tested empirically so far (apart from explicit training studies). In the present article,
we report on an empirical study (3 × 2 × 2 design) in which we systematically vary
visualization (no visualization vs. 2 × 2 table vs. tree diagram) and information format
(probabilities vs. natural frequencies) for two contexts (medical vs. economical context;
not a factor of interest). Each of N = 259 participants (students of age 16–18) had to
solve two typical Bayesian reasoning tasks (“mammography problem” and “economics
problem”). The hypothesis is that 2 × 2 tables and tree diagrams – especially when
natural frequencies are included – can foster insight into the notoriously difficult structure
of Bayesian reasoning situations. In contrast to many other visualizations (e.g., icon
arrays, Euler diagrams), 2 × 2 tables and tree diagrams have the advantage that
they can be constructed easily. The implications of our findings for teaching Bayesian
reasoning will be discussed.
Keywords: Bayesian reasoning, 2 × 2 table, natural sampling tree, natural frequencies, visual representation
Introduction
Bayes’ formula is vitally important in many areas, such as in medicine or law. Unfortunately,
both laymen and professionals have trouble understanding and combining statistical information
eﬀectively. The resulting misjudgments can have severe consequences, for example when juries
must convict or acquit defendants based on probabilistic evidence in legal trials (Hoﬀrage et al.,
2000; Krauss and Bruckmaier, 2014), or when physicians have to understand and to communicate
what a positive test result really means, for example in a HIV or cancer test (Ellis et al., 2014).
Consider, for instance, the classic mammography problem (adapted from Eddy, 1982; see also
Gigerenzer and Hoﬀrage, 1995; Siegrist and Keller, 2011; Micallef et al., 2012; Garcia-Retamero
and Hoﬀrage, 2013).
Mammography Problem (Probability Format):
The probability of breast cancer is 1% for a woman who participates in routine screening. If a woman
who participates in routine screening has breast cancer, the probability is 80% that she will have a
positive test result. If a woman who participates in routine screening does not have breast cancer, the
probability is 9.6% that she will have a positive test result. What is the probability that a woman who
participates in routine screening and receives a positive test result has breast cancer?
Answer: ______ %
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According to Bayes’ theorem, the resulting posterior
probability P(B| M+) is:
P(B|M+) = P(M+ |B) · P(B)
P(M+ |B) · P(B) + P(M+ |¬B) · P(¬B)
= 80% · 1%
80% · 1% + 9.6% · 99% ≈ 7.8%
The correct result 7.8% is much lower than most people,
including physicians, would expect (Eddy, 1982). Several
studies show that medical doctors (Hoﬀrage and Gigerenzer,
1998; Garcia-Retamero and Hoﬀrage, 2013), patients (Garcia-
Retamero andHoﬀrage, 2013), legal professionals (Hoﬀrage et al.,
2000), and students (Ellis et al., 2014) have diﬃculties with
similar tasks. In order to help people to understand the situation,
Gigerenzer and Hoﬀrage (1995) replaced the probabilities in
Eddy’s task by natural frequencies.
Mammography Problem (Natural Frequency Format):
100 out of 10,000 women who participate in routine screening
have breast cancer. Out of 100 women who participate in routine
screening and have breast cancer, 80 will have a positive result. Out
of 9,900 women who participate in routine screening and have no
breast cancer, 950 will also have a positive result. Howmany of the
women who participate in routine screening and receive a positive
test result have breast cancer?
Answer: ____ out of ____
The percentage of correct responses increased from about
10–20% to about 50% in 15 diﬀerent Bayesian reasoning tasks,
including the mammography problem (Gigerenzer and Hoﬀrage,
1995). While the facilitating eﬀect of natural frequencies is
accepted by now, scholars diﬀer in explaining this eﬀect.
Gigerenzer and Hoﬀrage (1995), for instance, argue that the
human mind is evolutionarily adapted to the information format
of natural frequencies (“ecological rationality”) that result from
a natural sampling process (Kleiter, 1994). Other theorists,
however, claim that essentially the partitive information structure
is responsible for the facilitating eﬀect (“nested sets hypothesis”;
e.g., Girotto and Gonzalez, 2001; Sloman et al., 2003; Barbey and
Sloman, 2007). Some scholars suggest that two diﬀerent cognitive
systems (“dual process theory”; Sloman, 1996; Kahneman and
Frederick, 2005; Barbey and Sloman, 2007) may be responsible
for inferences with respect to the diﬀerent information formats.
While probability format triggers intuitive thinking according
to system 1 (“associative system”; see also Sloman, 1996),
which may lead to base rate neglect, natural frequency format
triggers deliberate reasoning according to system 2 (“rule based
system”). Advocates of the dual process theory often support the
nested sets hypothesis (e. g., Barbey and Sloman, 2007). For a
discussion of the concept of natural frequencies see Gigerenzer
and Hoﬀrage (1999), Lewis and Keren (1999), Mellers and
McGraw (1999), Girotto and Gonzalez (2001, 2002), Hoﬀrage
et al. (2002), Barbey and Sloman (2007), or Sirota et al.
(2015a).
In fact, there are recommendations that natural frequencies
should become part of the training for all medical students
(Gigerenzer, 2013) and, moreover, should be part of elementary
school curricula (Gigerenzer, 2014). Although the eﬀect of
numerical format (probabilities vs. natural frequencies) is
quite substantial, it has to be noted that there is still
potential for improvement (“only” approximately 50% correct
solutions).
Another idea to improve insight into Bayesian reasoning
situations is the additional representation of visual aids such as
Euler diagrams, icon arrays, frequency grids, unit squares, roulette
wheel diagrams, and tree diagrams (see Figure 1). According to
the nested sets hypothesis, most of these visual aids represent
the set-subset relation of the information. For an overview of
possible visualizations see Paling (2003) or Spiegelhalter et al.
(2011). Figure 1 shows some visual aids which have been tested
empirically so far.
Sloman et al. (2003), Brase (2008), Micallef et al. (2012),
and Sirota et al. (2014b) investigated to what extent the
presentation of Euler diagrams can boost performance in
Bayesian reasoning tasks. They obtained diﬀerent ﬁndings
regarding the eﬀectiveness of Euler diagrams, a result which
potentially is aﬃliated to the various types of participants in
their studies. Icon arrays (also called pictographs) are matrices
of small ﬁgures that represent the given information. Within
an array, some of the icons are shaped in a special form
or are colored in order to show the number of ﬁgures that
fulﬁll a special feature. Brase (2008, 2014) and Zikmund-
Fisher et al. (2014) recommend risk communication via icon
arrays since their studies showed a positive inﬂuence of this
visual aid (for a discussion of the concept of “iconicity”
see, e.g., Sirota et al., 2014b). Frequency grids are close to
icon arrays showing the overall number of persons in a
large grid where particular subsets of persons are marked
characteristically. Garcia-Retamero and Hoﬀrage (2013) found
that both doctors’ and patients’ performance increased when
frequency grids are provided (see also Garcia-Retamero et al.,
2015). Unit squares (Bea, 1995; Sturm and Eichler, 2014) also
mirror the statistical information geometrically and represent
the diﬀerent sets of the task. Bea (1995) recommends the
visualization of information via a unit square since his research
reveals substantial improvement in performance. Roulette wheel
diagrams (Brase, 2014) summarize the information presented
by two circles (inner and outer circle) which represent
diﬀerent subsets of the problem. However, the additional
representation of a roulette wheel diagram causes only a very
small or even no improvement in performance compared
to versions without any visual aid (Brase, 2014). Friederichs
et al. (2014) investigated tree diagrams without numerical
values (except an imaginary sample size). In their studies,
performance in probability versions with tree diagrams was
similar to the performance in natural frequency versions without
visualization.
Note that one can diﬀerentiate between two types of studies
in general: On the one hand there are training studies where
participants are explicitly instructed in how to create visual aids
on their own, and consequently, how to combine the given
numbers to arrive at the solution. The eﬀect of this “teaching”
then is investigated by presenting additional problems without
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FIGURE 1 | Risk communication via Euler diagram, icon array, frequency grid, unit square, roulette wheel diagram, and tree diagram without
numerical information.
visualizations (e.g., Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 2001; Ruscio,
2003; Sirota et al., 2015b). On the other hand there are studies –
as in our study – where word problems are accompanied by
visualizations (e.g., Brase, 2008; Garcia-Retamero and Hoﬀrage,
2013). Note that in the latter studies, it is not taught how
to construct visualizations for fostering insight, and therefore,
there is no prior instruction as to how the given numbers
should be applied to infer the solution. The visualizations in this
case rather illustrate the information of the given problem in
parallel.
Interestingly, the beneﬁcial eﬀect of 2 × 2 tables and tree
diagrams presently was investigated only in the context of
training studies (e.g., Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 2001). This is
astonishing since scholars commonly use tree diagrams (Kleiter,
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1994; Gigerenzer and Hoﬀrage, 1995; Mandel, 2014; Navarrete
et al., 2014) and 2 × 2 tables (Goodie and Fantino, 1996;
Dougherty et al., 1999; Fiedler et al., 2000) containing numerical
values in their research papers to represent Bayesian reasoning
situations to their colleagues.
In the present paper we investigate how performance in
Bayesian reasoning tasks can additionally be enhanced by
providing 2 × 2 tables and tree diagrams containing numerical
values. Since 2× 2 tables and tree diagrams both can be equipped
with natural frequencies or with probabilities we decided to
test all four possible visualizations (compare Figure 2). Our
hypotheses were:
• Hypothesis 1: Problems in which information is presented
in natural frequencies are easier to solve than problems
containing probabilities. This holds true when problems
without visualization are compared (replication of previous
studies) and when problems with visualizations are compared.
• Hypothesis 2: The additional presentation of visualizations
of the numerical values (2 × 2 tables and tree diagrams)
facilitates understanding. This holds for natural frequency and
for probability versions as well.
We had no hypothesis as to which of both kinds of
visualization is more beneﬁcial. Furthermore we had no
hypothesis on the eﬀect of the problem context (we had chosen
two problem contexts for mutual validation of our results; see
Table 1).
Experimental Study
Design
In a paper-and-pencil questionnaire participants were presented
with two Bayesian reasoning tasks, the mammography problem
and a short version of the economics problem (Ajzen, 1977;
for problem formulations see Table 2). The design of the study
includes two factors of interest (visualization and format of
information) and one factor which was not of interest (context),
resulting in a 3 × 2 × 2 design:
• Visualization: no visualization vs. 2 × 2 table vs. tree diagram.
• Format of statistical information: probabilities vs. natural
frequencies.
• Context: mammography problem vs. economics problem (not
a factor of interest).
FIGURE 2 | Four resulting visualizations of the respective information format (mammography problem).
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TABLE 1 | Design of the 12 tested problem versions.
Context
Mammography
problem
Economics
problem
Format Probabilities • No visualization • No visualization
• 2 × 2 table • 2 × 2 table
• Tree diagram • Tree diagram
Natural frequencies • No visualization • No visualization
• 2 × 2 table • 2 × 2 table
• Tree diagram • Tree diagram
Each participant received one of the two problem contexts
with probabilities and the other problem with natural
frequencies. Thereby the order of context and information
format was varied systematically. Furthermore, if in one of the
two problems, for instance, a 2 × 2 table was added, in the
other problem either no visualization or a tree diagram was
presented. There were no time constraints for completing the
questionnaire (participants required about 20 min for both
tasks). In Table 1 the design, resulting in 12 tested versions,
is illustrated, whereas in Table 2 the corresponding problem
formulations are denoted.
The key factor under investigation in the present article
is the eﬀect of visualization. Note that in contrast to most
visual aids tested so far (Figure 1) our visualizations explicitly
contain numerical information. It is generally possible to
equip both 2 × 2 tables and tree diagrams with natural
frequencies or with probabilities, respectively (Figure 2). The
construction rationale for the visualizations was to provide
statistical information that is also reported in the typical problem
formulations. However, to “complete” the tree diagrams some
information must be added that is not mentioned in the
problem formulation (the information “20%” and “90.4%” in
the probability tree or “20” and “8,950” in the frequency
tree, respectively). In order to mirror these numerical values
in the 2 × 2 table containing natural frequencies, one
(of two possible) marginal distribution has to be depicted
(Figure 2). Most problematic is the construction of the 2 × 2
table with probabilities. Such 2 × 2 tables usually contain
conjoint probabilities, whereas Bayesian reasoning tasks contain
conditional probabilities. The underlying relationship between
both kinds of probabilities is included in the cells of the
2 × 2 tables (probabilities). It has to be noted that the
2 × 2 table (with conjoint probabilities), the 2 × 2 table (with
natural frequencies) and the tree diagram (with probabilities)
are part of the German school curriculum, whereas the tree
diagram with natural frequencies (“natural frequency tree”)is
not.
TABLE 2 | Problem formulations.
Mammography problem Economics problem
Probability version Natural frequency version Probability version Natural frequency version
Cover story Imagine you are a reporter for a women’s magazine and you want to write
an article about breast cancer. As a part of your research, you focuses on
mammography as an indicator of breast cancer. You are especially
interested in the question of what it means, when a woman has a positive
result (which indicates breast cancer) in such a medical test. A physician
explains the situation with the following information:
Imagine you are interested in the question, if career-oriented students
are more likely to attend an economics course. Therefore the school
psychological service evaluates the correlations of personality
characteristics and choice of courses for you. The following information
is available:
Version The probability of breast cancer is
1% for a woman who participates in
routine screening. If a woman who
participates in routine screening has
breast cancer, the probability is 80%
that she will have a positive test
result. If a woman who participates
in routine screening does not have
breast cancer, the probability is
9.6% that she will have a positive
test result.
100 out of 10,000 women who
participate in routine screening have
breast cancer. Out of 100 women
who participate in routine screening
and have breast cancer, 80 will have
a positive result. Out of 9,900
women who participate in routine
screening and have no breast
cancer, 950 will also have a positive
result.
The probability that a student
attends the economics course is
32.5%. If a student attends the
economics course, the probability
that he is career oriented is 64%. If a
student does not attend the
economics course, the probability
that he is still career-oriented is
60%.
325 out of 1,000 students attend
the economics course. Out of
325 students who attend the
economics course, 208 are
career-oriented. Out of 675
students who not attend the
economics course, 405 are still
career-oriented.
Visual aid • No visualization, or
• 2 × 2 table (prob.), or
• Tree diagram (prob.)
• No visualization, or
• 2 × 2 table (nat. freq.), or
• Tree diagram (nat. freq.)
• No visualization, or
• 2 × 2 table (prob.), or
• Tree diagram (prob.)
• No visualization, or
• 2 × 2 table (nat. freq.), or
• Tree diagram (nat. freq.)
Question What is the probability that a woman
who participates in routine
screening and receives a positive
test result has breast cancer?
How many of the women who
participate in routine screening and
receive a positive test result have
breast cancer?
What is the probability that a
student attends the economics
course if he is career-oriented?
How many of the students who
are career-oriented attend the
economics course?
Answer: _______ % Answer: ____ out of ____ Answer: _______ % Answer: ____ out of ____
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FIGURE 3 | Participants performance (error bars indicate the SE).
TABLE 3 | Results of binary logistic regression; independent variables:
visualization and information format; dependent variable: correctness of
solution.
Dependent variable: correctness of solution
Mammography problem Economics problem
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Independent variable EXP(B) EXP(B) EXP(B) EXP(B)
Format of information 9.40∗∗∗ 10.44∗∗∗ 22.44∗∗∗ 24.73∗∗∗
Visualization 4.99∗∗ 2.53∗
R2 0.19 0.27 0.41 0.44
EXP(B): Odds ratio (indicates how many times the odds of solving the task is higher
when the independent variable is 1, as compared to the independent variable of 0);
R2: Goodness of fit (according to Nagelkerke).
∗significant at p = 0.05; ∗∗significant at p = 0.01; ∗∗∗significant at p = 0.001.
Instrument
Each participant was presented two successive tasks which
varied in terms of (1) visualization (no visualization vs. 2 × 2
table vs. tree diagram), (2) information format (probabilities
vs. frequencies), and (3) problem context (mammography vs.
economics problem). All versions begin with a cover story
(see also Table 2); after that, one of three diﬀerent kinds of
visualization (including no visualization) was given (Figure 2).
Finally, the question was provided in the same format as the
information in the text.
The correct solution for the mammography problem is 80
out of 1,030 (about 7.8%), and for the economics problem
208 out of 613 (33.9%). Note that the corresponding algorithm
to calculate the Bayesian posterior probability is identical for
2 × 2 tables concerning both information formats. However,
the algorithm for computing P(B|M+) based on a tree diagram
diﬀers substantially with respect to both information formats.
A response has been classiﬁed as a correct “Bayesian
answer” if the exact probability or frequency solution
was provided, or the probability solution was rounded
up or down to the next full percentage point (e.g., in
the mammography problem the correct solution is 7.8%,
therefore answers between 7 and 8% were classiﬁed as
a correct solution; see also Gigerenzer and Hoﬀrage,
1995).
Participants
The participants were N = 259 German secondary school
students age 16–18. Students were recruited from 12 diﬀerent
classes (grade 11) at two Bavarian Gymnasiums. Note that in
Germany there are diﬀerent kinds of secondary school tracks. In
order to study at a university, the Gymnasium (academic track)
must be pursued. All students were familiar with 2 × 2 tables
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and tree diagrams containing probabilities and with 2 × 2 tables
containing frequencies but not with natural frequency trees.
The study was carried out in accordance with the University
Research Ethics Standards. The principals of both schools
approved conduction of the study (this is mandatory in Germany
when testing school students). When conducting the study
we did not collect personal data (our questionare did not
include questions with regard to age, gender etc.). Students were
informed that their participation was voluntary (two students
refrained from participating) and anonymity was guaranteed.
After the study participants were debriefed.
Results
Our study showed three important ﬁndings (Figure 3). First,
students’ performance was higher when information in the
problems was presented in natural frequencies (42% correct
inferences, averaged across context and visualization) instead
of probabilities (5%), which supports our hypothesis 1. This
ﬁnding holds when only problems without visualizations are
compared (26% correct inferences in natural frequency versions
vs. 2% correct inferences in probability versions, averaged
across both contexts, which replicates previous ﬁndings, e.g.,
Gigerenzer and Hoﬀrage, 1995; Siegrist and Keller, 2011) and
when problems with visualizations are compared (51% correct
inferences in natural frequency versions vs. 6% correct inferences
in probability versions, averaged across both contexts).
Second, the additional presentation of visualizations helps
understanding (hypothesis 2): Averaging across all versions with
visualization yields higher performance (28%) than averaging
across all versions without visualizations (14%). Note that this
diﬀerence is much stronger in the natural frequency versions
(51% vs. 26%, averaged across both contexts) than in the
probability versions (6% vs. 2%, see Figure 2). The fact that
probability visualizations only have very limited eﬀect is irritating
since these visual aids are frequently applied in statistical text
books (see Discussion).
Furthermore, participants showed better performance
in almost every version of the economics problem (30%
correct inferences, averaged across format of information
and visualization) compared to the respective versions of the
mammography problem (16%). Possible reasons will be debated
in Section “Discussion.”
In order to analyze the impact of information format and
visualization simultaneously we ran binary logistic regressions.
Since we had no hypothesis on possible eﬀects of problem context
we performed two logistic regressions for the mammography
problem and for the economics problem separately. The
independent variables were visualization (only distinguishing
between no visualization vs. visualization) and information
format, respectively. The dependent variable was the correctness
of the solution (1 – correct solution, 0 – incorrect solution). The
results of the statistical analyses are illustrated in Table 3. For
both contexts model 1 shows the impact of information format,
whereas model 2 shows the impact of information format and
visualization simultaneously.
In both problem contexts we found signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
regarding information format (hypothesis 1) and visualization
(vs. no visualization; hypothesis 2). Additional analyses revealed
no statistical diﬀerences between 2 × 2 table and tree diagram in
each information format. Although Figure 3 suggests a possible
interaction of format and visualization the regression does not
yield a respective signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Note that the seeming
interaction between format and visualization may be due to the
ﬂoor eﬀect with respect to the probability versions. However,
considering Figure 2 it becomes clear that visualizations of the
numerical values in probability versions do not help substantially.
Discussion
According to general theories of information encoding and
processing (e.g., Cognitive Load Theory, Sweller, 2003;
Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning, Mayer, 2005),
understanding of statistical information could be supported
by presenting additional visual aids. In our study, participants’
performance in two Bayesian reasoning tasks was higher
when additionally 2 × 2 tables and tree diagrams containing
natural frequencies were presented. However, when applying
these visual aids for Bayesian inferences, the information
format should be taken into account: both tools have only
very limited eﬀects when probabilities are included. Since
in statistics text books and school curricula both probability
visualizations – but not frequency trees – commonly are
applied in order to foster insight, this ﬁnding is quite
remarkable.
In general, our results are in line with the “frequentist
hypothesis” (Gigerenzer and Hoﬀrage, 1995; Cosmides and
Tooby, 1996) as well as the “nested sets hypothesis” (Barbey and
Sloman, 2007). Regarding all problem versions, natural frequency
versions resulted in higher performance levels compared to
the respective probability versions. The low performance,
however, in the natural frequency version of the mammography
problem without visualization indicates only moderate statistical
literacy in the participants of our study. Interestingly, the
performance in the economics problem was much better than
in the mammography problem under almost every condition.
A possible reason might be the extreme base rate (1%) in the
mammography problem which basically constitutes the cognitive
illusion (in contrast, the result of the economics problem is
no longer counterintuitive). Another reason might be that the
context of the economics problem is more adapted to the living
environment of young people (a strong dependency from the
problem context was also found by Siegrist and Keller, 2011).
The more complicated terminology or taxing cognitive capacity
in the mammography problem could also account for the deviant
eﬀects in the diﬀerent contexts (e.g., Lesage et al., 2013; Sirota
et al., 2014a).
The need for tools for teaching statistics is repeatedly stressed
(Gigerenzer, 2013, 2014; Navarrete et al., 2014). There are several
teaching studies (Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 2001;Wassner, 2004;
Mandel, 2015; Sirota et al., 2015b) where the solution process
of a Bayesian reasoning problem is explained explicitly, e.g.,
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with the help of visualizations, and the eﬀect of teaching is
investigated. For instance, it is even possible to advise students
to imagine an arbitrary sample when given a probability version
and then to construct a frequency table or tree diagram
accordingly (by increasing the size of the arbitrary sample whole
numbers always can be reached for each respective subset).
Furthermore Hoﬀrage et al. (submitted, same issue) instructed
participants to solve complex Bayesian reasoning problems (e.g.,
with more than one cue) by translating the given information in
terms of probabilities into natural frequencies and to construct
a corresponding tree diagram accordingly. Note again, that
our study is not an explicit teaching study; nevertheless our
ﬁndings have pragmatic implications for teaching Bayesian
reasoning. Our visualizations have the advantage that they can
be constructed easily by teachers or students. In contrast, the
diagrams in Figure 1 are complicated to produce, which is
especially problematic when base rates are extreme. In the unit
square, for instance, areas can become very small (in Figure 1
therefore a higher base rate of the disease was chosen). Similarly,
concerning the icon array, more symbols would be required in the
case of small or unmanageable proportions (such as 1.25 or 9.6%)
thus entailing an enormous eﬀort. Our frequency visualizations,
which of course can be combined with other visualizations (for an
integration of a natural frequency tree and an icon array see, e.g.,
Mossburger, unpublished manuscript), thus may be a helpful aid
for fostering statistical understanding and for teaching statistics
in schools.
Note that 2 × 2 tables and tree diagrams containing natural
frequencies can not only aid in Bayesian reasoning problems, but
can also illustrate situations with two dichotomous features in
general. For instance, it is possible to justify and explain the rules
for multiplication and addition of conditional probabilities with
natural frequency trees very easily (Mossburger, unpublished
manuscript). Since 2 × 2 tables and tree diagrams containing
natural frequencies can be provided long before students have
to solve Bayesian reasoning problems, these visual aids oﬀer the
opportunity to consider various types of problems over a long
period of a school or university curriculum.
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